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Abstract 
New policy approaches to facilitate the co-existence of wildlife and livestock are increasingly being sought-after as human 
sprawl increases and carnivore populations decrease. In this paper, models are developed to assess how alternative policy 
approaches can provide a livestock herder with incentives to sustain the socially optimal carnivore population. The well-
established policy ex-post compensation is analyzed and compared to the innovative conservation performance payment 




Carnivores are widely acknowledged to be an important 
part of biodiversity conservation. However, today 80, or 
about a fourth of the world’s carnivore species, are listed 
on the IUCN red list of endangered species as either vul-
nerable, endangered, critically endangered, or even extinct 
in the wild. Agriculture, habitat loss and habitat fragmen-
tation cause major threats to nearly all of these carnivores. 
Sustaining healthy populations of large carnivores often 
requires vast, undisturbed areas.  
 
Pristine natural areas are persistently shrinking in size as 
the growing human population is converting more and 
more land for agricultural purposes. The FAO estimates 
that the amount of arable land will increase by 120 mio. 
hectares, or 12%, until 2030 compared to the amount of 
arable land in 1997/99 (FAO, 2002). Unsurprisingly, carni-
vore-livestock conflicts arise at the fringe between wild 
and agricultural land. Loss of livestock to carnivore attacks 
can be devastating for poor farmers in marginal areas 
(Thirgood et al., 2005; Woodroffe et al., 2005; Mishra, 
1997). Livestock’s role as source of food and income is obvi-
ous, but livestock has many more functions spanning from 
forms of saving over means of transportation to tokens of 
social esteem. 
 
Conflicts between humans and wildlife are estimated to 
be the most acute in the tropics due to the rapidly increas-
ing human demand for land and scarce resources (Mad-
husudan, 2003). Case studies from India revealed that 
close to a tiger reserve households, on average, lost 16% of 
their annual income due to predation by carnivores (Mad-
husudan, 2003). In Bhutan households around a national 
park are reported to have lost more than two-thirds of 
their average income through carnivore attacks (Wang & 
Macdonald, 2006). Around the Serengeti National Park in 
Tanzania, pastoralists’ mean average loss of livestock Introduction 
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equated to more than two-thirds of the households’ aver-
age annual cash income (Holmern, Nyahongo & Roskraft, 
2006). In Zimbabwe the economic loss per livestock hold-
ing household accumulated to an average of 12% of the 
households’ net annual income (Butler, 2000). 
 
Poaching in retaliation or simply to prevent further dam-
age is rather common in many rural societies. During the 
last decades, various policy approaches have been devel-
oped and implemented to alleviate wildlife-livestock con-
flicts. The range of these policies stretches from fences and 
fines approaches (Casey et al., 2006) over ex-post compen-
sation to benefit sharing strategies, sometimes referred to 
as  Community-based Wildlife Management, CWM (see 
Songorwa, 1999, for a critical evaluation). 
 
Imposing a punishment on people caught poaching en-
dangered species is a very common policy. Although fines 
and punishments for poaching may be set at a high level, 
the probability of getting caught is often very low and, 
especially in developing countries, law enforcement may 
be deficient. It is suggested that increasing detection rates 
and law enforcement is often likely to be a more effective 
strategy to counteract poaching than merely increasing 
fines (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland, 1993; Hilborn et 
al., 2006). The imposition of fines on poaching without any 
supplementary compensation or positive incentive scheme 
gives rise to equity concerns. In particular, such an ap-
proach implies that the local livestock herders have to bear 
the costs of carnivore conservation without being com-
pensated or remunerated by the rest of society which in 
turn benefits from carnivore’s existence value.  
 
Evidence is scarce that the above mentioned approaches 
have been successful in creating true pro-conservation 
incentives among livestock herders. New policy ap-
proaches to facilitate the co-existence of wildlife and live-
stock are increasingly being sought-after as human sprawl 
increases and carnivore populations decrease.  
 
The recent theoretical literature on wildlife conservation 
can roughly be grouped into two strains. The first can be 
termed non-policy models, i.e. models that discuss issues 
such as wildlife extinction (Swanson, 1994), wildlife re-
introduction initiatives (Rondeau, 2001; Skonhoft, 2006), 
and trade-offs between agriculture and conservation 
(Bulte & Horan, 2003). These models have policy implica-
tions but do not explicitly focus on analyzing policy out-
comes.  
 
The second group of models is directly concerned with the 
analysis of different wildlife management policies. Zivin et 
al. (2000) discuss alternative management options for 
species that can be considered as either pest or resource. In 
particular, they focus on the two population control meas-
ures trapping and hunting.  
 
Building on Bulte & Horan (2003), Bulte & Rondeau (2007) 
criticize the general presumption that paying compensa-
tion to offset damage caused by wildlife supports conser-
vation. They develop a model to analyze how compensa-
tion payments affect the allocation of labor between agri-
cultural production, protection of crop fields, and wildlife 
hunting. Compensation payments are found to have am-
biguous effects on wildlife stocks and local welfare be-
cause they may reduce hunting efforts but simultaneously 
provide incentives to convert natural habitat into agricul-
tural land which is detrimental for wildlife.   
 
Skonhoft’s (1998) model is embedded in a typical scenario 
where a wildlife conservation park is surrounded by local 
farmers and their livestock. The model focuses on a cost 
and benefit sharing policy approach. In particular, the 
effects of transferring a fixed share of hunting profits to 
locals are compared to the effects of transferring a fixed 
share of hunting and tourism profits. Skonhoft concludes 
that providing locals with benefits from hunting and tour-
ism is a promising approach to reduce incentives for illegal 
poaching.  
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The effects of benefit sharing programs on communities’ 
incentives to conserve wildlife are also addressed in a 
model by Fischer, Muchapondwa & Sterner (2005). They 
find that wildlife conservation programs, such as CAMP-
FIRE, that focus on sharing resource profits do not neces-
sarily result in net benefits for the communities. Whether 
profit sharing succeeds in providing conservation incen-
tives to communities is found to depend on (i) the type of 
resource profits that are shared, (ii) to what extent the 
shared profits offset the agricultural losses, and (iii) the 
feedback of community-external actors in terms of chan-
ges in their resource management practices. Very similar 
to Skonhoft (1998) they point out that to strengthen locals’ 
incentives for conservation, there must be a straight-
forward and comprehensible link between locals’ actions, 
changes in the park’s wildlife stock and profits shared with 
the community. If locals receive payments that are disjunc-
ted from their actions and changes in the park’s wildlife 
stock, this monetary transfer will not affect their conserva-
tion incentives.  
 
Conservation performance payments, which are a type of 
payments for environmental services, are a relatively new 
policy approach and have not been analyzed in previous 
models of wildlife conservation. Performance payments 
are monetary or in-kind payments made by a paying agen-
cy to individuals or groups and are conditional on specific 
conservation outcomes (Albers & Ferraro, 2006; Engel et 
al., 2008). In our context, the conservation outcome is the 
size of the wildlife stock (or a function of stock such as 
offspring). Performance payments are suggested to be 
more direct and more cost-effective than alternative 
approaches (Ferraro & Simpson, 2002; Wätzold & Dre-
chsler, 2005; Casey & Boody, 2007). To our knowledge, in 
the carnivore conservation context the only existing large-
scale performance payment scheme is currently imple-
mented in Sweden (Zabel & Holm-Müller, 2008).
1 
 
                                                                            
1  See Wunder et al. (2008) for a recent review of payment for 
environmental services schemes in other contexts. 
The purpose of this paper is to add to the above-
mentioned literature on wildlife conservation policies by 
analyzing the effects of conservation performance pay-
ments in comparison to the more conventional ex-post 
compensation approach. Due to the deficiencies discussed 
above, the fines and fences approach will not be included 
into the analysis.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
theoretical model developed to compare the alternative 
policy schemes. The focus is on the two policy approaches 
(i) ex-post compensation and (ii) performance payments. 
In section 3, an empirical simulation of the model with 
data from tiger-livestock conflicts in India is presented. 
Section 4 discusses and summarizes the results. 
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2 The  model 
Our model incorporates the dynamics of livestock and 
carnivore populations. We compare the long-run equilibria, 
i.e. steady state solutions, for two different scenarios. The 
analysis starts by taking the view of a social planner whose 
goal is to maximize the present value of society’s welfare. 
The social planner takes into account the costs and bene-
fits that accrue to a livestock herder as well as society’s 
existence value for the carnivore population. In a next step, 
we determine the decentralized market outcome for a 
homo-economicus livestock herder who optimizes the 
present value of his individual lifetime utility in the ab-
sence of policy measures.  
 
The theoretical model presented here draws on the models 
developed in Damania et al. (2003), Bostedt (2001) and 
Bostedt (2005), the latter in turn have connections to other 
models of agricultural households (e.g. Singh, Squire & 
Strauss, 1986), as well as models of self-employed forest 
owners (e.g. Johansson & Löfgren, 1985, chapter 7). The 
most important difference compared with these previous 
models is that this model focuses on the effects of large 
carnivores on pastoralist livestock herders, and on the 
incentives for poaching caused by different compensation 
systems. 
 
We assume that the livestock herder does not internalize 
society’s existence value for carnivores and it is further 
assumed that the herder personally assigns no existence 
value to carnivores. Thus by intuition, the carnivore popu-
lation in the livestock herder’s steady state equilibrium 
must be smaller than the carnivore population in the social 
planner’s steady state equilibrium. The goal of the analysis 
is to determine how alternative policy mechanisms can 
influence the livestock herder’s decision making process 
and eventually alter the steady state carnivore population 
in the herder scenario. The steady state equilibrium de-
rived from the social planner scenario is used as a bench-
mark to compare and evaluate the two alternative policy 
mechanisms (i) ex-post compensation and (ii) performance 
payments. 
 
2.1  Social planner and  
market equilibria 
The social planner maximizes the present value of lifetime 
income of the representative livestock herder plus the 
existence value of the carnivore population. 
   




tdt ,    0 (1) 
 
where    is the discount rate and t  is an index of time. 
The social planner takes into account the income that the 
livestock herder generates by harvesting and selling live-
stock,  h , at the price  p ,  0  H p  (subscripts indicate the 
argument of a derivative). In general, p is a function of the 
total amount of livestock sold on the world market and  i  
is the country index,
 
Ht = hit
i  . For simplicity we take the 
amount of livestock supplied by the rest of the world, 
t H , 
to be constant over time. A lso for simplification reasons 
we denote  () tt pH h +  by  () t ph  in the following. 
 
The term  t ro  captures the herder’s off-farm income. It is 
the product of the exogenously given off-farm wage rate, 
r , and the time spent working off-farm,  t o . For simplicity, 
harvesting livestock is assumed not to consume time. The 
time consuming activities that the livestock herder can 
choose between are either carnivore hunting, l , or off-
farm work, o . With leisure time assumed constant, L is 
total labor time and thus his time constraint is defined as:  
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Finally, the social planner also takes society’s existence 
value of the carnivore population,  () t W E , into account. It is 
assumed that the existence value depends positively on 
the population size ( 0 > w E ). 
 
In his optimization, the social planner considers the popu-
lation dynamics of carnivores and livestock: 
 
() ( ) t t t t W l f W G W  =   (3) 
()() t t t t h W k X F X   =   (4) 
 
In the following the time index t is dropped for notational 
simplicity. 
 
The carnivore population (W ) changes over time (Eq. 3) as 
a function of natural growth,  () W G , minus the number of 
carnivores that are hunted,  () W l f . The latter is a function 
of the time spent hunting carnivores and carnivore abun-
dance itself. It is assumed that  () l f  exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale in l ( 0 > l f , 0 < ll f ) (see Damania et al., 
2003). The natural growth function  () W G , is assumed to 




















> 0 for W < 0.5Wmax
= 0 for W = 0.5Wmax








and  0 < ww G . 
 
The livestock population,  X , changes over time (Eq. 4) as a 
function of natural growth,  () X F , minus the number of 
livestock killed by the carnivores,  () W k  with  0 > w k
2,3, and 
                                                                            
2  Considerable ecological research exists about this relationship, 
known as the predator functional response, see e.g. Abrams & 
Ginzburg (2000).  
 
 
the number of livestock harvested by the herder, h . The 
natural growth function for livestock,  () X F , is also as-













1   






> 0 for X < 0.5Xmax
= 0 for X = 0.5Xmax








and  0 < XX F . 
 
The dynamic optimization problem of maximizing (1) sub-
ject to (2), (3) and (4) with  () 0 0 W W =  and  () 0 0 X X =  
given, results in the following current value Hamiltonian 




sp = ph () h+ rL  l () + EW () + 
sp GW ()  fl () W ()
 
+
sp FX ()  kW ()  h ()  (5) 
 
where the superscript SP indicates the social planner sce-
nario. The state variables are the carnivore population, W , 
and the livestock population, X . The co-state variables are 
sp   and 
sp  . The control variables are the amount of live-
stock harvested, h , and the amount of time spent hunting 
carnivores, l .  
The first order conditions for this social planner model are 




r  =   (6) 
() h p h ph










sp sp F      =  =    (9) 
                                                                                                                         
3 In an alternative version of the model, the predation function 
was also made dependent on the abundance of livestock. The 
results of the model were in principle the same as those pre-
sented here but the expressions obtained were considerably 
more complicated. The calculations are available upon request. The model 
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Equation (6) states that the shadow price of carnivores is 
equal to the off-farm wage rate divided by the number of 
carnivores killed per marginal time unit spent hunting 
carnivores. Equation (7) simply says that the shadow price 
of livestock is equal to its market price. Assuming for sim-
plicity a small open economy in which a marginal change 
of livestock harvested, h , has no influence on the world 
market price, the first term on the right hand side of (7) is 
zero. For simplicity, this term will be dropped in the re-
mainder of the analysis. 
 
As in Zivin (2000) we assume that in the steady state, the 
carnivore and livestock populations as well as their 
shadow prices are constant over time, 
0 = = = =
sp sp X W       . 
 
This allows us to determine the following steady state 
conditions: 
 
() ( ) W l f W G =  (3’) 
 














fl l () EW +  (8’) 
 
 = X F  (9’) 
 
Equation (3’) requires that to maintain a stable population, 
the amount of carnivores hunted must exactly equal car-
nivore population growth. Similarly, equation (4’) states 
that livestock population growth must equal the sum of 
livestock harvested by the herder and livestock killed by 
carnivores. Equation (8’) describes the marginal carnivore 
population regeneration at the steady state. The left-hand 
side stands for the marginal regeneration minus the num-
ber of carnivores hunted in the steady state. The first term 
on the right-hand side is the ratio of the two stock vari-
ables’ shadow prices times the number of livestock killed 
by a marginal carnivore. The second term on the right 
hand side is the existence value of a marginal carnivore 
divided by the shadow price of carnivores. The last term on 
the right hand side is the discount rate. Equation (8’) will 
be used for further analysis. Equation (9’) states that the 
net marginal livestock population growth must be equal to 
the discount rate.  
 
The steady state livestock population is determined by (9’). 
Equations (3’), (4’) and (8’) together determine the steady 
state carnivore population number, the corresponding 
level of carnivore hunting, and the equilibrium livestock 
harvest level.  
 
As discussed earlier, by intuition, the livestock herder who 
does not internalize carnivores’ existence value will favor a 
smaller carnivore population than the social planner.  
 
To formalize this intuition, the livestock herder’s optimiza-
tion problem is set up. The only difference to the social 
planner scenario developed above is that it does not in-
clude the term for the existence value,  () W E .  
 
The livestock herder maximizes the present value of his 
lifetime income subject to the population dynamics and 
his time constraint:  





  + =
0
max ,   0    
s.t. 
 
   
 W = GW ()  fl () W  
 
   
 X = FX ()  kW ()  h  
 
o l L + =  
 
() 0 0 W W =  given,  () 0 0 X X =  given. 
 
The current value Hamiltonian for the livestock herder is: 
 

LH = ph () h+ rL  l () + 
LH GW ()  fl () W ()  
 
+
LH FX ()  kW ()  h ()  (10) 
 
where the superscript LH refers to the livestock herder 
scenario. Since the analysis of the first order conditions is 
basically equivalent to that for the social planner model 
we will not write them down in detail here. The steady 
state conditions for the livestock herder model are: 
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() ( ) W l f W G =  
 
() () W k X F h  =  
 





G W l W  (11) 
 
 = X F  
 
To compare the carnivore population in the steady state of 
the social planner and livestock herder models we examine 
how equations (8’) and (11) relate to each other. The differ-
ence is in the additional term 
W lE f
r
W  on the right hand 
side (
SP RHS )  o f  e qu a ti on  (8 ’ ) . Th e  t e r m i s p o si t iv e  an d 
stands for the existence value of a marginal carnivore 
divided by its shadow price. In other words it signifies the 
marginal benefit to marginal cost ratio of an additional 
carnivore.  
() () ( ) ()  + +  = W l W l
SP E l f
r
W












G LHS LHS W
LH SP  = =  
To find out whether the carnivore population must in-
crease or decrease when moving from the livestock 
herder’s to the social planner’s steady state we can insert 
* LH W  into the social planner model. (The asterisk in the 
superscript indicates the steady state). This would result in 
an inequality with  () ()
* * LH SP LH SP W RHS W LHS <  due to 
the additional term on the 
SP RHS  of (8’). To retain the 
equality 
SP SP RHS LHS = , the carnivore population must 
adjust. The essential question is then how the 
LH LHS  
and 










W  (12) 
                                                                            
4  Please note that 





 in (13) is negative. In the steady state 
() ( )/ = fl G W W holds. An increase in W lowers  () / GW Wand 
therefore also l as we assumed strict monotonicity with respect 



























RHS  (13) 
The term in front of the bracket in equation (13), 
r
pW f k l w  , is equal to the   








=  (14) 
 



















































, . The sign of  A 
depends on the functional form of the carnivore predation 
function,  () W k . Provided  () W k  is either linear or convex, 
the term  A is positive. A linear form of  () W k  implies that 
each carnivore preys upon a constant number of livestock. 
A convex shape of  () W k  accounts for positive scale effects 
in the carnivores’ hunting techniques. This may be espe-
cially relevant for carnivore species that are more efficient 
predators when they hunt in packs, e.g. wolves. For linear 




W RHS LHS < . The same may hold for a con-
cave form of  () W k  unless  WW k  is so negative that it domi-
nates the other summands in  A. Concavity of  () W k  may 
occur for carnivore species which, with increasing 
population densities, face intraspecies crowding-out ef-
fects. For example, carnivores spend substantial amounts 
of time and energy on defending their territories and thus 





W RHS LHS <  holds, this relationship al-
lows us to confirm the intuition that the steady state car-
nivore population is larger in the social planner model than 
in the livestock herder model. A very simplified depiction of 
the problem in Figure 1 may help illuminate this finding. 
The intersection of 
LH LHS  and 
LH RHS  indicates the 
steady state equilibrium carnivore population 
* LH W . The 
difference between the 
LH RHS  and 
SP RHS , which for 
simplicity is drawn as a parallel shift, signifies the addi-The model 
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tional term that the social planner takes into account, 
W lE f
r
W , the marginal existence value of a carnivore 
divided by its shadow price. 
 
The comparison of the social planner and livestock herder 
models has revealed that in the absence of policy meas-
ures, the livestock herder will reduce the carnivore popula-
tion to a lower level than is socially desirable. 
 
 
Figure 1: Steady state equilibria in the livestock herder and 
social planner models 
 
2.2 Policy  analysis 
The steady state equilibrium in the social planner model 
can now be defined as the benchmark that is supposed to 
be attained by means of alternative policy mechanisms. 
Two policy mechanisms, (i) ex-post compensation and (ii) 
performance payments, will be analyzed for their potential 
to shift the livestock herder’s steady state carnivore popu-




Ex-post compensation means that livestock herders re-
ceive a certain amount of money for livestock lost in carni-
vore attacks. This is a rather common policy in Europe and 
the US but also in developing countries such as India or 
Kenya (Saberval et al., 1994; Mishra, 1997; Fourli, 1999; 
Madhusudan, 2003; Western & Waithaka, 2005). Several 
problems inherent to ex-post compensation schemes have 
been identified. In particular these are (i) moral hazard, (ii) 
long time lags between the predation incident and the 
actual payment, (iii) high transaction costs, and (iv) prob-
lems of trust and transparency (Nyhus et al., 2005; Zabel & 
Holm-Müller, 2008). Although well-intended, due to these 
accompanying problems, ex-post compensation may often 
fail to provide true pro-conservation incentives. 
In the model, we only focus on the general functioning of 
ex-post compensation and do not consider any of the 
afore-mentioned problems. Ex-post compensation is in-
cluded into the livestock herder model as the product of 
the compensation payment, q , and the number of live-
stock that are killed by carnivores,  () W k . The new current 




LHex post = ph () h+ rL  l () + qk W ()  
 
+
LH GW ()  fl () W () +
LH FX ()  kW ()  h ()  
 
The steady state carnivore population for the livestock 
herder in the model with ex-post compensation can now 
be compared to the model without any policy. The 
post LHex RHS
  i s  f o un d  t o  b e  l a r g e r  t ha n  





qWf . In other words, this term equals 
the compensation payment times the number of livestock 
killed per marginal carnivore divided by the shadow price 
of a carnivore. This result tells us that, ceteris paribus, the 
steady state carnivore population will increase along with 
an increase in the compensation payment. It will also in-
crease as the number of livestock killed by an additional 
carnivore increases. Equivalently, it will increase along with 






qWf  can be compared with 
W lE f
r
W , which 
was the difference between the private and socially opti-
mal solution in absence of policy measures. This means 
that if  W W E qk =  the ex-post compensation system will 
achieve the social planner’s solution. This requires two 
crucial pieces of information; knowledge on the marginal 
existence value for the carnivore,  W E , and knowledge on 
the marginal effect of an increase in the carnivore popula-
tion on the number of livestock killed by carnivores,  W k . 
Note that not only point estimates are sufficient, but the 
whole functions are necessary. The ratio between the 
values of these two functions, when evaluated at 
* SP W , 
the social planner’s optimal carnivore population, will give 
the correct level of the ex-post compensation payment. 
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Another policy implication that can be derived from the 
model is that, provided the number of livestock killed by a 
marginal carnivore is relatively small, introducing an ex-
post compensation scheme will not significantly aid in 
increasing the steady state carnivore population unless the 
compensation payment, q, is sufficiently large.  
 
Performance payments 
In the performance payment approach, the payments are 
directly linked to the size of the wildlife stock (or a function 
of stock, such as offspring). In the Swedish conservation 
performance payment scheme, the government has de-
fined explicit goals for the size of the wolverine and lynx 
populations that it would like to host in the country (Swed-
ish Government Bill, 2000). Wolverines (Gulo gulo), which 
are listed as vulnerable on the IUCN red list of endangered 
species (Mustelid Specialist Group, 1996) and lynx (Lynx 
lynx) are two predators that feed on reindeer and cause 
great economic damage to the indigenous reindeer herd-
ing Sami people (Persson, 2005; Swenson & Andrén, 2005; 
Danell et al., 2006). The semi-domesticated reindeer are 
kept in a nomadic system and are moved between low-
lands and mountains depending on season. Neither wol-
verines nor lynx hibernate and especially during the winter 
months both depend on the abundance of reindeer as prey 
species (Pedersen et al, 1999). Prey availability is also con-
sidered an important factor for wolverine reproduction 
success (Persson, 2005). Until 1996, an ex-post compensa-
tion scheme was installed under which the herders could 
claim compensation for reindeer that were verified to have 
been killed by carnivores. In 1996, the ex-post compensa-
tion scheme was abolished and replaced by a performance 
payment scheme. Today, the reindeer herders are remu-
nerated based on the number of carnivore offspring that 
are certified on their reindeers’ grazing grounds. The great 
advantage of these conservation performance payments is 
that they provide very straightforward pro-conservation 
incentives (Zabel & Holm-Müller, 2008). The main activi-
ties that the reindeer herders can engage in to promote 
carnivore conservation are to refrain from (illegal) poach-
ing and to let reindeer roam free as potential food for 
carnivores. Illegal poaching of carnivores is a serious issue 
in Sweden (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 
2007). In a long-term study 60% of adult mortality among 
wolverines was ascribed to sure and likely cases of illegal 
poaching (Persson, 2007); for lynx the corresponding rate 
was estimated at 46% (Andrén et al., 2006). However, data 
from the annual carnivore inventories suggests that espe-
cially the endangered wolverine population is facing an 
upward trend in recent years. This population increase 
must be interpreted and appreciated with care since next 
to anthropogenic influences natural environmental factors 
and improved data collection methods may also play a 
role.  
 
The performance payments can be incorporated into the 
model as a function of the carnivore population,  () W V . In 
the Swedish example the payment is based on carnivore 
offspring but for generality we will model the payment as 
a general function of the carnivore stock. The resulting 




LHperformance = ph () h+ rL  l () +VW ()  
 
+
LH GW ()  fl () W () +
LH FX ()  kW ()  h ()  
 
As in the analysis above, we compare the steady state 
conditions for this model with the steady state conditions 
for a livestock herder in a scenario without any policy. The 
comparison reveals that the performance payment shifts 
the 
nce LHperforma RHS  by the positive term 
r
Wf V l w . This term 
stands for the performance payment per marginal carni-
vore times the carnivore population and the number of 
carnivores hunted per marginal unit of time, divided by the 




W , which was the difference between the 
private and socially optimal solution in absence of policy 
measures. Thus, if  W W E V =  the performance payment 
system will achieve the social planner’s solution. This re-
quires only one crucial piece of information; knowledge on 
the marginal existence value for the carnivore,  W E . The 
marginal existence value for the carnivore when evaluated 
at 
* SP W , the social planner’s optimal carnivore population, 
will give the correct level of the performance payment.  
 
Corner solutions 
S o  f a r ,  w e  h a v e  a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e  m o d e l  w i l l  r e a c h  a n  
interior solution. However, if the social planner’s optimal 
steady state carnivore population is beyond the limits 
given by the ecosystem’s carrying capacity, the policy 
analyses must operate with a corner solution. Figure 2 The model 
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depicts such a scenario. The livestock herder’s optimal 
steady state carnivore population is smaller than the carry-
ing capacity but the social planner’s optimal carnivore 
population is larger. In this case, the social planner’s will-
ingness to pay is larger than the payment that is necessary 
to shift the livestock herder to the carrying capacity. Such 
scenarios are likely to occur when the social planner takes 
the global existence value of a charismatic carnivore into 
account and compares it to costs that only arise at a local 
scale in a developing country.  
 
 
Figure 2: Social planner model limited by carrying capacity, 
max W  
 
Comparison of total program cost 
Given that ex-post compensation and performance pay-
ments can both be used to achieve the social planner’s 
optimum (or the corner solution), an interesting question 
is which program will cause higher costs. This is of interest 
because program budgets are frequently limited, and 
raising program funds is likely to cause transaction costs 
(Engel et al., 2008). For an interior solution of the model, 
total program costs (denoted as TC) under the ex-post 
compensation scheme are given by  
() W k q TC
post ex * =
 , where 
*
*






= .  
Assuming for simplicity that performance payments are 
linear in the level of carnivore stock
5, total program costs 
of performance payments can be written as  
 
                                                                            
5  Most current schemes of payments for environmental services 
have constant per-unit payment (Engel et al., 2008).  
W V TC W
e performanc = , where, to achieve the social planner’s 
optimum,  * SP W W W W E V
= = .  
 
Thus, we have: 
e performanc post ex TC TC
<







Thus, the relative size of the two programs’ total costs 
depends on the shape of the function  () W k , i.e. the func-
tional response in the predator prey relationship, at the 
optimal level of carnivore stock. This implies that the total 
cost of the ex-post compensation is 
(i) equal to that of the performance payment if  () W k  is 
linear in W  (at least at 
* SP W );  
(ii) higher than the cost of the performance payment if 
() W k  is concave in W  (at least at 
* SP W ); and  
(iii) lower than the cost of the performance payment if 
() W k  is convex in W  (at least at 
* SP W ). 
 
 
In case of a corner solution the ex-post payment, 
corner q , 
respectively marginal performance payment, 
corner
W V  that 
is necessary to shift the livestock herder to the carrying 









G q = +  =   
()







G V = +  =  . 
The comparison of the total costs for a corner solution 
reveals the same results as for the interior solution. Which 
of the policy schemes is less expensive depends on the 
functional response in the predator prey relationship 
evaluated at the carrying capacity. 
 
                                                                            
6 Please note that at the carrying capacity population growth is 
zero,  0 ) ( = W G .  
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3 Empirical  analysis 
Tigers (Panthera tigris) are one of the carnivore species that 
are currently facing dramatic declines in population size. 
India’s tiger population is estimated at only approximately 
1400 individuals (Jhala et al., 2008). Currently there are 
two different conservation policy approaches imple-
mented in India. Convicted poachers face fines and prison 
sentences. Next to punishments for poaching, compensa-
tion payment schemes are installed in the buffer zones of 
many tiger reserves. Recently, however, park managers, 
conservationists, and policy makers expressed general 
interest in the conservation performance payments ap-
proach (Damania et al., 2008).  
 
As discussed above, the functional forms of carnivore 
population and livestock population growth functions 
() W G , and  () X F  are assumed to be logistic. The data we 
use for the analysis is collected from various case studies 
and conservation reports. They are very rough estimates 
and although they are drawn from the available literature, 
we do not claim they necessarily are good representations 
of the actual ecological and economic relationships. Most 
prominently, there still is a research gap concerning the 
function for tigers’ existence value. For the computation 
below we estimated an existence value function based on 
data for national annual investments into 27 tiger reserves 
and their respective tiger populations. It is important to 
notice that since this function was derived only with data 
on national investments, we are simulating a national 
social planner, who does not take the global society’s exis-
tence value for tigers into account. A global social planner 
who acknowledges tigers’ existence value as a true univer-
sal public good is likely to incorporate higher marginal 
existence values into his calculations. An analysis of six 
data points provided in Damodaran (2008) on interna-
tional investments into Indian tiger reserves provides 
evidence in support of this hypothesis.  
 
In this empirical analysis, tigers’ livestock predation tech-
nology is described by a linear function which implies that 
each tiger kills a constant number of livestock. A concave 
functional form would mean that tigers, e.g. due to intras-
pecies crowding-out effects, are less efficient hunters as 
their population density increases. A convex functional 
form, by contrast, would imply that tigers become more 
efficient as their population density increases. 
 
The goal of the empirical analysis below is to provide an 
indication of how the model could be used for policy impli-
cations if reliable data were available. The functional forms 
and data sources used here are enlisted in Table 1. 
 
For the given data, the model arrives at an interior solu-
tion. The national social planner’s optimal carnivore popu-
lation for the 1350sqkm reserve is 163.5 tigers. This corre-
sponds to roughly 75% of the carrying capacity. Prior to the 
implementation of any policies, the steady state popula-
tion of carnivores in the livestock herder model is 0.023 
animals.  
 
The question now is how the alternative policy mecha-
nisms could be implemented to provide the livestock 
herder with incentives to increase the carnivore population 
up to the social planner’s optimum. As discussed in the 
theoretical section above, ex-post compensation can pro-
vide pro-conservation incentives. For the given data, a 
compensation payment of INR999.94 (or approx. 
USD19.65) per goat, i.e. nearly a goat’s market price is nec-
essary to provide sufficient incentives for the herder to let 
the carnivore population grow to the social planner’s goal.  
 Empirical analysis 
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Table 1: Values and functional forms used in empirical analysis 
Variable  Value or functional form  Data source 
   Discount rate  0,08  Grameen Bank (2008) 
j   Intrinsic goat popula-
tion growth rate 
1,6  Dey et al. (2007) 
g   Intrinsic tiger popula-
tion growth rate 
0,06  Smirnov & Dale (1999) 
r   Off-farm wage rate  INR 12000 (Proxy for a year’s 
salary with INR 40 per day.) 
Damania et al. (2003) 
() l f   Poaching technology  ()
5 , 0 l l f =   Damania et al. (2003) 
(for computational ease 
46 . 0 l  was rounded to 
5 . 0 l ) 
p   Price of goat (per 
animal) 
INR 1000  Madhusudan (2003)  
() W k   Tigers’ livestock 
predation technology 
5*W  Tigers are estimated to prey on appr. the equivalent of 50 
wild ungulates per year. Scat analyses revealed that 10% 
of tigers’ diet is livestock (Bagchi et al., 2002). 
w E   Tigers’ marginal 
existence value 
INR 154273 -INR 912.92*W 
  Estimation based on national investments into 27 Indian 
tiger reserves in 2001-2002 and the reserves’ tiger popula-
tions. (R
2 = 0.4622) 
Data source: Project Tiger (2008) 
max W   Carrying capacity  216  Damodaran (2007) 
(for an average sized 1350sqkm reserve) 
INR 100  USD 1.96 (December 2008). 
 
The calculation above refers to a national social planner 
but it is also possible to run the model for regional or 
global social planners who, due to different existence 
values, may strive for differing optimal carnivore popula-
tion sizes. Figure 3 shows the optimal compensation pay-
ments for alternative policy goals. The horizontal axis 
indicates the hypothetical policy goals and the vertical axis 
shows the corresponding optimal compensation payment. 
If there is no deviation between the social planner’s and 
the livestock herder’s initial steady state, obviously no 
compensation payment is necessary. For our given data, 
any policy objective that aims at achieving a carnivore 
population somewhere in the interval between 0.023 and 
the carrying capacity of 216 tigers results in an optimal 
compensation payment that is lower than the market price 
of livestock. The development of the optimal compensa-
tion payments in this interval is due to two counteracting 
effects. As the carnivore population increases, hunting 
becomes less time consuming and thus the opportunity 
costs of hunting decrease. In the calculation of the optimal 
compensation payment this benefit is subtracted from the 
market price of livestock. However, the higher the social 
planner’s intended carnivore population, the lower is the 
corresponding hunting level. The goal of attaining 100% of 
the carrying capacity rules out all hunting activities. Thus, 
at this level, the reduced opportunity costs of hunting do 
not play a role and a full compensation of the livestock’s 
market price becomes necessary.  
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Figure 3: Development of optimal compensation payment 
for data given in Table 1. 
As alternative to ex-post compensation we have proposed 
the performance payment approach. For the empirical 
assessment the national social planner’s goal is again to 
increase the carnivore population to 163.5 tigers. For the 
given functional forms and data in Table 1, a performance 
payment of INR4999.72 (or approx. USD 98.25) per tiger 
would be necessary to provide the livestock herder with 
the adequate incentives to achieve the goal. Due to the 
assumption that the functional response in the predator-
prey relationship has a linear form the total program costs 
will be equal for this empirical example.  
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4 Discussion 
In the previous sections we developed a model for a social 
planner and a livestock herder and compared the steady 
state carnivore populations that resulted from the models. 
As intuition suggested, the steady state carnivore popula-
tion in the social planner model was higher than in the 
livestock herder model. We then analyzed the potential of 
the ex-post compensation policy to provide incentives for 
the livestock herder to reach the socially optimal carnivore 
population. Additionally, we analyzed a rather new policy 
approach, conservation performance payments, which in 
the carnivore conservation context is currently only imple-
mented at a large scale in Sweden. 
 
A result derived from the theoretical models is that both 
performance payments and ex-post compensation pro-
vide pro-conservation incentives. Although not modeled 
here, relatively high ex-post compensation payments that 
are issued without any conditions on livestock protection 
measures may distort incentives to optimally protect live-
stock. Moral hazard created by these distorted incentives 
results in welfare losses. This problem arose in some in-
dustrial countries (Swenson & Andrén, 2005), but is of less 
concern in developing countries where compensation 
payments tend to be far below the actual value of the 
livestock, the process of filing for compensation is often 
cumbersome, and dependence of individual households 
on single animals is often high. Performance payments do 
not distort incentives to optimally protect livestock since 
the payments are directly linked to the conservation goal 
(e.g. the carnivore stock or carnivore offspring). 
 
In section three, the model was analyzed with empirical 
data drawn from other models and case studies on tiger-
livestock conflicts in India. Due to the existing knowledge 
gaps on tiger ecology and tigers’ existence value, many 
functions in the empirical model are rather rough esti-
mates. The given data resulted in a model with an interior 
solution. The optimal ex-post compensation payment was 
found to be only slightly less than the market price of live-
stock. Most Indian states have compensation schemes for 
livestock depredation but full compensation of the ani-
mal’s market price is an exception. In Maharashtra for 
example, compensation payments do not exceed 75% of 
the livestock’s market price (Union Ministry of Environment 
and Forests, 2005). A study conducted at Bhadra tiger 
reserve revealed that the compensation issued by the 
forest department only corresponds to 5% of the total 
losses claimed. If compensation is paid to a herder, on 
average, it offsets 27% of the livestock’s value that the 
herder declared in the application (Madhusudan, 2003). 
Referring to the results of our model, it is unlikely that such 
low compensation payments can provide optimal conser-
vation incentives.  
 
Which single scheme or mix of policies is optimal for a 
certain carnivore-livestock conflict will also always greatly 
depend on the specific context. An important factor that 
may influence the decision is the size of the budget avail-
able to set up, run, and monitor a scheme. Our results 
indicate that the relative cost of an ex-post compensation 
scheme vs. a performance payment scheme depends on 
the functional response in the predator prey relationship; 
both for models with interior and corner solutions. The 
discussion of the alternative policies focused on assessing 
t h e  a m o u n t  o f  p a y m e n t s  t h a t  a r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a c h i e v e 
certain policy goals. However, the models could also be 
utilized to compute which level of carnivore conservation is 
theoretically realizable with a given budget. 
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Apart from budget issues, the degree of effective law en-
forcement in a country is also of importance. Livestock 
herders will want to have securities of being able to claim 
the payments they are entitled to. Corruption can be a 
great obstacle for all types of schemes. Corruption to-
gether with a lack of public confidence in wildlife man-
agement authorities provide dim prospects for the success 
of any scheme, no matter how well designed it is (Ferraro, 
2005). Another obstacle in developing countries is that any 
type of payment scheme might act as a welfare magnet, 
attracting people to move to the carnivore dense areas. 
Next to the more general framework conditions, under-
standing how livestock herders make decisions is crucial 
when designing incentive-based schemes. Profound 
knowledge of socio-economic household factors may 
prove to be essential. For example, people in some rural 
regions of India are strictly vegetarian whereas in others 
they are not. Incentives that, e.g. aim at reducing competi-
tion between livestock and carnivores’ natural prey species 
by increasing livestock harvest rates may simply not work 
in regions where there is no market for meat. Similarly, 
infrastructure availability may determine whether off-
farm work is a real alternative to agriculture. Many more 
such examples could be mentioned, but which socio-
economic factors are most relevant will always vary from 
case to case. 
 
There are several lines of possible extension to the model 
presented here. An obvious one is the consideration of 
multiple livestock holders. Another one would be to in-
clude livestock protection effort as an additional activity, 
thereby permitting an examination of potential moral 
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